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Abstract
I consider a model of intertemporal trade where agents lack commit-
ment, agent types are private information, there is an absence of record-
keeping, and societal penalties are infeasible. Despite these frictions, I
demonstrate that policy can be designed to implement the first-best allo-
cation as a (stationary) competitive monetary equilibrium. The optimal
policy requires a strictly positive interest rate with the aggregate inter-
est expenditure financed in part by an inflation tax and in part by an
incentive-compatible lump-sum fee. An illiquid bond is essential only in
the event that paying interest on money is prohibitively costly.
1 Introduction
Kocherlakota (2003) describes an environment for which nominally risk-free
bonds are essential in monetary economies. His argument is intriguing because
it rationalizes the societal benefits of illiquid bonds. Put diﬀerently, and some-
what more provocatively, it demonstrates how a society can potentially be made
better oﬀ by imposing, rather than removing a cash-in-advance constraint.
His environment contains a number of key frictions. First, individuals lack
commitment and recordkeeping is absent; these properties are suﬃcient to en-
sure that money is essential; see Kocherlakota (1998). Second, agent types are
private information; this has the eﬀect of precluding type-contingent monetary
transfers. And third, society cannot impose penalties on individuals (which
precludes, among other things, the use of lump-sum taxes). The monetary
equilibria that emerge in his environment are ineﬃcient. The introduction of
a liquid bond (a risk-free claim to money, usable for payments) can in no way
improve eﬃciency; as liquid bonds are just another form of money. By restrict-
ing the liquidity of bonds, agents can engage in meaningful ex post money-bond
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trades; the eﬀect of which is to direct liquidity to those who turn out to desire
it most.
The initial motivation for my own paper was to generalize Kocherlakota’s ar-
gument in the context of an environment where the societal benefits of an illiquid
bond last for more than one period. Moreover, Kocherlakota only demonstrates
how an illiquid bond can improve welfare; he does not characterize the optimal
intervention. With this in mind, I chose to recast his model—maintaining all of
the key frictions described above—in the context of a quasi-linear environment,
similar to the one first introduced by Lagos and Wright (2005).
Proceeding in this manner, I discovered something interesting; namely, that
I could not replicate his result. This was highly unexpected as our respective
environments embed—as far as I can tell— the same critical frictions. Despite
of these severe frictions, I demonstrate that a well-designed monetary policy
can implement the first-best allocation making use of a single type of token;
an illiquid bond is not essential.1 What is essential in my model is that money
earn interest and that at least some fraction of the aggregate interest expense be
financed with a lump-sum “tax” that is paid voluntarily by agents. An illiquid
bond is essential only if one rules out the possibility of paying interest on the
economy’s circulating medium.
To develop my argument, I proceed as follows. First, I describe a very simple
quasi-linear environment along the lines of Andolfatto (2008) and characterize
the first-best allocation.2 I then employ the standard frictions that make money
essential. I also assume that agent types are private information, which has
the eﬀect here of ruling out type-contingent transfers. I then characterize a
(stationary) competitive monetary equilibrium under a given policy regime.
I begin by describing optimal policy under the assumption that lump-sum
taxation is feasible. I also allow the government to pay interest on money.
Not surprisingly, I find that the Friedman rule—paying zero interest on money
and contracting the money supply via lump-sum taxation—is an optimal policy.
Strictly speaking, however, the optimal policy is in a sense indeterminate. That
is, the first-best allocation can also be implemented by setting a strictly positive
interest rate in excess of the money growth rate; with the implied interest burden
financed via lump-sum taxation. Hence, interest-bearing money can be part of
an optimal policy; but it is not essential.
Next, I rule out lump-sum taxation. This restriction is one that is com-
monly employed in the literature. But it is important to understand exactly
what is being ruled out here. The assumption is that coercive lump-sum tax-
ation is infeasible; not that voluntary lump-sum payments (fees paid for some
type of benefit) are infeasible. Implicitly, the literature assumes that lump-sum
1That the first-best is implementable is surely an artifact of my quasi-linear environment;
but that constrained-eﬃcient implementation requires no illiquid bond is likely robust.
2There is one critical diﬀerence that deserves mention. In Andolfatto (2008), I assume that
society can punish individuals by banishing them to an autarkic state. In this paper, societal
penalties of any form are entirely absent.
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payments in any form are infeasible. If this is the case, I show that a constrained-
eﬃcient allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium with a constant money
supply. Here, as before, it is possible to have implementation associated with a
strictly positive interest rate; but once again, this is not essential.
The main point of my paper is then established by working oﬀ the insight
described in the paragraph above. I demonstrate that if lump-sum taxation
is ruled out, a policy can still be designed in a manner that implements the
first-best allocation. The optimal policy requires a strictly positive interest rate
with the aggregate interest expenditure financed in part by an inflation tax and
in part by a lump-sum fee. Agents are free not to pay any fees; they must be
compelled to do so voluntarily. I demonstrate that this can be accomplished by
making the interest payment on money subject to a redemption charge (with
the fee made contingent on the amount of money presented for redemption).
As for the societal benefit of introducing an illiquid bond, the conclusion
appears to be valid in my environment only if one is willing to impose an addi-
tional extraneous restriction; namely, that paying interest on the economy’s cir-
culating medium is prohibitively costly. Even in this case, however, an optimal
(incentive-feasible) policy requires the application of a lump-sum redemption
fee (in this case on bonds, rather than money).
2 The Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical agents, distrib-
uted uniformly on the unit interval. Each period t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞ is divided into
two subperiods, labeled day and night. Agents meet at a central location in both
subperiods; in particular, I abstract from the commonly employed assumption
of random pairwise meetings in one of the subperiods.
All agents have common preferences and abilities during the day. Let xt(i) ∈
R denote the consumption (production, if negative) of output in the day by agent
i at date t. The key simplifying assumption is that preferences are linear in this
term. The possibility of exchange then implies transferable utility. Output
produced in the day is nonstorable, so an aggregate resource constraint implies:Z
xt(i)di ≤ 0; (1)
for all t ≥ 0.
At night, agents realize a shock that determines their type for the night.
In particular, agents either have a desire to consume, an ability to produce, or
neither. Refer to these types as consumers, producers, and nonparticipants, re-
spectively. Types are determined randomly by an exogenous stochastic process.
This process is i.i.d. across agents and time; there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Let π ∈ (0, 1/2) denote the measure of agents who become either consumers or
producers; so that (1− 2π) denotes the measure of nonparticipants.
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A consumer has utility u(c) and a producer has utility −g(y); where c ∈ R+
and y ∈ R+ denote consumption and production of the night good, respectively.
Assume that u00 < 0 < u0, limc→0 u0(c) =∞ and g0, g00 > 0 with limy→0 g0(y) =
0. Nonparticipants neither value consume nor are they able to produce it; their
utility is normalized to zero. As the night good is also nonstorable, there is
another aggregate resource constraint given by:Z
ct(i)di ≤
Z
yt(i)di; (2)
for all t ≥ 0.
As agents are ex ante identical, their preferences can be represented as:
E0
∞X
t=0
βt {xt(i) + π [u(ct(i))− g(yt(i))]} . (3)
where 0 < β < 1. Note that there is no discounting across subperiods.
Weighting all agents equally, a planner maximizes (3) subject to the resource
constraints (1) and (2). As utility is linear in xt(i), agents are indiﬀerent across
any lottery over {xt(i) : t ≥ 0} that delivers a given expected value. Without
loss of generality, a planner may set xt(i) = 0 for all i and all t ≥ 0. Since g
is strictly convex, all producers will be required to produce a common level of
output y ≥ 0. Given the strict concavity of u, all consumers will be allocated a
common level of consumption c ≥ 0. Given that the active population is divided
equally among producers and consumers at night, the resource constraint (2)
implies c = y. Hence, conditional on a given level of y (and invoking the fact
that Ext(i) = 0), ex ante welfare is represented by:
W (y) =
µ
π
1− β
¶
[u(y)− g(y)] . (4)
Clearly, there is a unique maximizer 0 < y∗ <∞ satisfying:
u0(y∗) = g0(y∗). (5)
In what follows, I refer to y∗ as the first-best allocation. Associated with this
allocation is any lottery over xt(i) that generates Etxt(i) = 0.
I impose the following additional restrictions on the environment. First, I
assume that agents lack commitment and that private trading histories are un-
observable. Together, these two frictions generate a role for fiat money. Second,
I assume that agent types at night (whether consumer, producer, or neither) are
unobservable. The role of this latter assumption is to rule out the possibility
of type-dependent monetary transfers at night. Third, I assume that society
cannot impose any penalties on individuals. This last assumption is critical; to
highlight its role, I begin by first assuming that the contrary is true.
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3 Individual Decision-Making
Let z ≥ 0 denote the cash balances held by an agent at the end of the night.
These balances are carried forward to the next day and transform into Rz units
of money at the beginning of the day; where R ≥ 1 denotes the (gross) nominal
interest rate. For the moment, assume that all agents are obliged to pay a
nominal lump-sum tax τ in the day (this represents a nominal transfer if τ is
negative). Let (vd, vn) denote the values of money (the inverse of the price-levels)
in the competitive spot markets prevailing in the day and night, respectively. I
denote “next period” values with superscript “+” and “previous period” values
with superscript “—”.
3.1 The Day-Market
Let m denote money carried forward into the night-market. An agent’s day-
market budget constraint is given by:
x = vd(Rz − τ −m).
Let N(m) denote the value of entering the night-market with m units of
money. Assume, for the moment, that N 00 < 0 < N 0 (a conjecture that will
prove to be true). Making use of the budget constraint above, the value of
entering the day-market with money z can therefore be expressed as:
D(z) ≡ max
m
{vd (Rz − τ −m) +N(m)} . (6)
The demand for money during the day is characterized by:
vd = N 0(m). (7)
As emphasized by Lagos and Wright (2005), the quasi-linear nature of prefer-
ences implies that money demand at this stage is independent of initial money
balances and the lump-sum tax (transfer). Moreover, the value function D(z)
is linear in z; i.e.
D0(z) = Rvd. (8)
3.2 The Night-Market
3.2.1 Consumers
Let C(m) denote the value associated with being a consumer, entering the night-
market with money balance m. This money is used to make purchases of output
y at the prevailing price-level v−1n ; hence, future money balances must obey
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z+ = m − v−1n y, with the further restriction that z+ ≥ 0. Hence, the choice
problem can be stated as:
C(m) ≡ max
y,,z+
©
u(y) + βD(z+) : z+ = m− v−1n y ≥ 0
ª
.
A well-known property of this solution is that for policy parameters away
from those that implement the first-best allocation, the constraint z+ ≥ 0 will
bind tightly.3 In this case, the solution is given by:
y = vnm; (9)
so that the value function is given by:
C(m) ≡ u(vnm) + βD(0). (10)
By the envelope theorem:
C 0(m) = vnu0(y). (11)
3.3 Nonparticipants
Let I(m) denote the value associated with being “idle” (a nonparticipant), en-
tering the night-market with money balance m. This type of agent faces no
choice problem; i.e., z+ = m. The associated value function is given by:
I(m) ≡ βD(m); (12)
with
I 0(m) = Rβv+d ; (13)
where this latter result makes use of (8).
3.4 Producers
Let P (m) denote the value associated with being a producer, entering the night-
market with money balance m. If a producer makes sales of output y at the
prevailing price-level v−1n , his future money balances are given by z+ = m+v−1n y.
Clearly, the constraint z+ ≥ 0 will not bind in this case and the choice problem
may be formulated as:
P (m) ≡ max
y,z+
©
−g(y) + βD(z+) : z+ = m+ v−1n y
ª
. (14)
The supply of output is characterized by:
3The constraint will bind weakly when policy parameters are set to achieve the first-best.
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vng0(y) = Rβv+d ; (15)
where use has been made of (8). In addition, we have the envelope result:
P 0(m) = Rβv+d ; (16)
where again, use has been made of (8).
3.5 Gathering Restrictions
The ex ante value function associated with entering the night-market with
money balances m is given by:
N(m) ≡ πC(m) + (1− 2π)I(m) + πP (m). (17)
Utilizing results (11), (16), and (13), we have:
N 0(m) = πvnu0(y) + (1− π)Rβv+d . (18)
Combining (18) with (7) and (15) implies:
vd = πvnu0(y) + (1− π)vng0(y).
Multiplying both sides of the expression above by Rβ and updating one period
results in the expression:
Rβv+d = Rβv
+
n
£
πu0(y+) + (1− π)g0(y+)
¤
.
Making reference once again to condition (15), the expression above can alter-
natively be stated as:
vng0(y) = Rβv+n
£
πu0(y+) + (1− π)g0(y+)
¤
. (19)
4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, m = M, so that by condition (9), the night value of money
satisfies vn = y/M and µ
v+n
vn
¶
=
µ
M
M+
¶µ
y+
y
¶
.
Assume that the money supply grows at a constant rate μ ≥ β, so that M+ =
μM. In what follows, I restrict attention to a steady-state in which y = y+, so
that (v+n /vn) = (1/μ). Combining these restrictions with condition (19) allows
us to characterize the (stationary) equilibrium level of output in the night-
market yˆ by:
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g0(yˆ) =
µ
Rβ
μ
¶
[πu0(yˆ) + (1− π)g0(yˆ)] (20)
The transactions that occur at night imply that, in equilibrium, consumers
leave the night-market with z+ = 0 money balances, producers leave with z+ =
2M money balances, and idle agents leave with z+ =M money balances. Hence,
at the beginning of any arbitrary date, the distribution of money balances at
the beginning of the day falls on a three-point set z ∈ {0,M−, 2M−} .
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we need to ensure that the
government policy parameters (μ,R) are consistent with government budget
balance. At the beginning of the day, the money supply is given by M− =
π(0) + (1 − 2π)M− + π2M−. The government creates new money (μ − 1)M−
and collects a lump-sum tax τ to finance interest payments (R− 1)M−. Hence,
the government budget constraint is given by:
τ = (R− μ)M−. (21)
I am now in a position to characterize equilibrium activity in the day-market.
Utilizing (15) and the fact that yˆ = v−nM−, the equilibrium value of money in
the day-market is given by:
vd = g0(yˆ)
µ
yˆ
RβM−
¶
. (22)
The equilibrium level of output transacted in the day-market can now be de-
duced from (22), (21), and the budget constraint x = vd(Rz − τ −m). In par-
ticular, it is easy to establish that producers use their excess money balances to
purchase
xˆ = β−1g0(yˆ)yˆ
units of output in the day market. This output is supplied by consumers who
desire to replenish their money balances (idle agents make no transactions in this
market).4 At the end of the day, the distribution of money holdings collapses
over M.
4.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
Condition (20) reveals that the optimal monetary policy entails setting (μ,R)
such that Rβ = μ. From the government budget constraint (21), we see that an
optimal policy requires lump-sum taxation; i.e., τ = (1− β)RM− > 0.
4Observe that from an ex ante perspective, agents are faced with a lottery over the day
good. The expected value of this lottery satisfies:
π(−xˆ) + (1− 2π)(0) + π(xˆ) = 0;
so that the risk induced by the sequence of spot markets entails no ex ante welfare loss.
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It is frequently asserted that the optimal policy is characterized by the Fried-
man rule; i.e., R = 1 and μ = β. But the analysis here demonstrates that this
policy is not uniquely optimal. In particular, the first-best allocation can also be
implemented by setting R = β−1 and μ = 1. In both cases, lump-sum taxation
is necessary. For the Friedman rule, taxation is required to contract the money
supply, which generates the requisite deflation. In the latter case, taxation is
necessary to finance the interest paid on money. Both policy schemes work to
implement the first-best allocation because both serve to align the marginal real
return on money to the socially desirable rate.
Result 1 When lump-sum taxation is feasible, a policy that sets τ∗ = (1 −
β)RM− with any combination of (μ,R ≥ 1) satisfying Rβ = μ imple-
ments the first-best allocation as a competitive monetary equilibrium. That
is, interest-bearing money is not essential.
One conclusion that follows here is that if lump-sum taxation is feasible,
then paying interest on money is not essential—following the Friedman rule is
suﬃcient. One way to bypass the Friedman rule as a prescription for optimal
policy is to simply rule out lump-sum taxation; i.e., restrict policy so that τ ≤ 0,
which from (21), implies R ≤ μ.When R = 1, the constrained-eﬃcient monetary
policy in this case is to set μ = 1 (a constant money supply). By condition (20),
the constrained-eﬃcient level of output at night falls in the range 0 < yC < y∗.
Note that the analysis here suggests that the constrained-eﬃcient level of
output yC can also be implemented with any policy in the form of R = μ ≥ 1. In
other words, even when lump-sum taxation is ruled out, a constrained-eﬃcient
policy may involve a strictly positive interest rate. However, it appears that the
original conclusion remains valid; i.e., paying interest on money is not essential
(doing so does not alter the real marginal return on money).
In what follows, I wish to challenge the notion that interest-bearing money
is not essential when taxation is infeasible. I claim that, not only is paying
interest on money essential (whether directly, or indirectly via interest-bearing
bonds), but that the first-best allocation is itself implementable.
5 Incentive Compatible Monetary Policy
Assume that society is unable to impose any direct penalties on individuals.
That is, society cannot prevent people from trading; nor can it forcibly seize
output or money. This restriction obviously rules out the use of coercive lump-
sum taxation. However, it does not rule out the possibility that agents may
voluntarily agree to pay a “tax” (better interpreted, in this case, as a fee for
some type of service).
Monetary policy is designed as follows. First, the government agrees to
pay interest on money R ≥ 1. Second, the government stipulates that in order
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to receive interest on money, agents must display their money holdings to the
government. Third, to be entitled to the interest payment, agents are asked to
pay a lump-sum nominal fee f ; this fee may be made conditional on the amount
of money presented for redemption. Note that agents are free not to display
their money or pay any fee; it is this sense in which “taxation” is voluntary.
I assume that the fee schedule takes the following form:
f(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if z > M−;
φ if z ∈ (0,M−];
0 if z = 0;
(23)
where φ ≥ 0. Anticipating equilibrium behavior, this fee schedule implies that
producers and consumers will be exempt from any redemption charge. Of course,
as consumers return from the night-market with zero money balances, they
would earn no interest and hence would not pay any fee even if it was applicable.
If producers were subject to a redemption fee, they would have to evaluate the
cost and benefit of incurring it. But as I have set the redemption charge on
“large” money balances to zero, it follows that producers stand to gain from
displaying their money.5 Hence, the only “incentive-compatibility” condition
that needs to be checked is whether it is indeed rational for idle agents (those
with “small” money balances) to present their money for redemption.6
One benefit of the policy I have constructed here is that, if incentive-compatibility
holds, then the relevant components of individual behavior are characterized ex-
actly in the manner described earlier; in particular, condition (19) continues to
hold.7
Let me now describe the way government finance works, anticipating some
equilibrium behavior. First, a fraction π of the population will return to the day
market with “large” money balances 2M−, which implies an interest expense
of (R − 1)π2M−. I assume that the government finances this interest expense
entirely with new money creation (μ− 1)M−; so that
R =
µ
μ− 1
2π
¶
+ 1. (24)
This clearly implies R > μ for all μ > 1. In other words, this policy serves to
increase the real marginal return to accumulating money balances for producers
5Note that the fee schedule (23) implies that the value function D(z) is not diﬀerentiable at
the point z =M−. However, if the producer generates any positive output, the relevant value
function D(z+) is diﬀerentiable over z+ ≥ M. We still need to check whether the producer
might want to mimic the idle agent; i.e., he can do so by producing y = 0 so that z+ =M. It
is easy to verify that the producer will not want to do so.
6 It has been pointed out to me that the fee schedule (23) may not be robust to a “coalitional
deviation.” In particular, idle agents may want to combine their money holdings and entrust
one of the group to redeem a “large” pool of money so as to avoid the redemption penalty.
Doing so, however, would require a degree of commitment; and would therefore be inconsistent
with the properties of this environment.
7This would not be true if, for example, I considered a policy that conditioned the interest
rate on individual money balances.
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in the night-market (the resulting inflation tax is borne in part by other agents
in the economy).
There is still the question of how the government is to finance the interest
cost on “small” money balances. Here, I propose that the cost is met entirely
by the lump-sum redemption fee φ; i.e.,
(1− 2π)(R− 1)M− = (1− 2π)φ;
so that
φ = (R− 1)M−. (25)
With the fee designed in this manner, idle agents are just indiﬀerent (in equi-
librium) between displaying their money or not; so I assume that they do. In
other words, the monetary policy described here is incentive-compatible.
For a given policy (μ,R), condition (20) describes an equilibrium yˆ. To im-
plement the first-best allocation, we require μ = Rβ. When lump-sum taxation
is feasible, I noted above that the optimal interest rate policy is indeterminate
(and that paying interest was inessential). In the present context, however,
there is an additional restriction that needs to be satisfied; i.e., condition (24).
Evidently, the optimal interest rate policy in this case is given by:
R∗ =
µ
1− 2π
β − 2π
¶
> 1. (26)
In what follows, I assume that β > 2π.
Result 2 In the absence of societal penalties, the first-best allocation remains
implementable under policy (R∗, μ∗, φ∗); where R∗ given by (26), R∗ >
μ∗ = βR∗ > 1, and φ∗ = (R∗ − 1)M− > 0.
One may be left wondering at this stage whether it is necessary to finance a
component of the aggregate interest expense with a lump-sum charge. In partic-
ular, why not simply finance the entire interest expense by printing money? To
address this question, assume that a fraction 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 of the interest expense
in (25) is financed via new money creation; in which case,
(R− 1) [2π + λ(1− 2π)]M− = (μ− 1)M−.
Rearranging this expression and imposing μ = Rβ implies:
R =
∙
1− 2π − λ(1− 2π)
β − 2π − λ(1− 2π)
¸
.
This expression corresponds to (26) when λ = 0. A look at the denominator
reveals that this expression can only make sense under the parameter restriction:
λ <
µ
β − 2π
1− 2π
¶
< 1. (27)
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In other words, financing aggregate interest expenditures entirely by money
creation (λ = 1) cannot implement the first-best allocation. That is, implemen-
tation requires a strictly positive lump-sum fee.
It is of some interest to point out, however, that financing some of the interest
cost on “low” money balances is possible; i.e., by setting λ > 0 in a manner
that does not violate the bound (27). The eﬀect of such a policy would be to
increase the rate of money creation and the nominal interest rate. At the same
time, such a policy would ensure that (R∗ − 1)M− > φ∗, so that individuals
with “low” money balances would now strongly (rather than weakly) prefer to
exercise redemption.
5.1 Discussion
When society is prevented from administering individual penalties, lump-sum
taxation is precluded. When lump-sum taxation is precluded, the Friedman
rule (setting the net nominal interest rate to zero and contracting the supply
of money) is infeasible. It is widely presumed that when the Friedman rule is
infeasible, the equilibrium allocation is constrained to be second-best. In the
context of the environment laid out here, this second-best allocation can be
achieved with a constant money supply.
There are two ways in which to view the nature of the ineﬃciency at the
second-best. The first view highlights the fact that consumers are liquidity/debt
constrained. Consumers (the high marginal utility types in Kocherlakota’s
model) would like to borrow if they could; but their anonymity precludes nor-
mal debt market operations. If types were observable, then policy might in
principle rectify this situation by targeting money transfers to consumers in the
night-market. But as types are private information, such a policy is infeasible;
see also Levine (1991). In Kocherlakota (2003), an ex post asset market allows
consumers to dispose of their (illiquid) bonds at discount for cash to meet their
liquidity needs. The eﬀect of this operation is to transfer purchasing power in
the socially desirable direction; i.e., away from low marginal utility types and
toward high marginal utility types. The former are rewarded in the future via
the implied interest they earn on accumulated bond holdings.
The second view highlights the fact that the real rate of return on money
is too low at the second-best. Hence producers (the low marginal utility types
in Kocherlakota’s model) are induced to undersupply output (undersave). One
way to stimulate their saving is to increase the real return on money (the only
vehicle for saving in this environment). In my setup, this is accomplished by
paying interest on money and financing at least a part of the interest expense
via lump-sum fees. In this manner, consumers do not need any additional
liquidity. That is, the added production (saving) allows consumers to purchase
more output with the money they already have.
These two views are, of course, related; they simply represent two sides of the
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same coin. The former view emphasizes the role of policy in helping consumers,
while the latter view emphasizes the role of policy for inducing savers. In general
equilibrium, this amounts to the same thing.
6 Money and Bonds
Consider an economy where society issues two types of fiat tokens; one of which
is designed to circulate as money, and the other—called a bond—which consti-
tutes a risk-free claim against the money token. Moreover, imagine that society
purposely hampers the use of bonds as a means of payment; so that a cash-in-
advance constraint is the product of policy, rather than any inherent property
of the environment. Kocherlakota (2003) asks the following question: Under
what circumstances does the policy of creating two fiat tokens and having one
trade at a discount to the other constitute the optimal policy?
Such a policy is potentially beneficial only in circumstances where individu-
als have diﬀerent intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in the equilibria
of monetary economies. This condition is obviously not satisfied in the present
environment if either: [1] lump-sum taxation is feasible; or [2] money can earn
interest. Kocherlakota (2003) explicitly rules out [1] (there are no societal penal-
ties) and implicitly rules out [2]. This latter restriction does not appear to follow
from any property of his model’s environment.8
If we rule out paying interest on the circulating medium (a policy that may
be impractical in reality), then Kocherlakota’s argument can be shown to hold in
my environment as well. To see this, imagine that trade proceeds as before, with
agents trading output for money in the sequence of spot markets. Money earns
no interest. The only modification to the trading structure is the introduction
of a “discount window,” which is operated by the government just subsequent to
night-market trading. At this window, money can be exchanged for bonds at the
discount price q ≤ 1. That is, a bond pays oﬀ q−1 units of money immediately
the next day. Hence, bonds are purposely rendered illiquid in the sense that
they can never be used to purchase output.9
Anticipating equilibrium behavior, it will be suﬃcient to issue bonds in two
denominations; “large” and “small.” The optimal policy will be to discount
bonds at rate q∗ = (1/R∗); with R∗ > 1 determined by (26). Moreover, an
optimal policy will require expansion in the money supply at rate μ∗ = βR∗ > 1
and a redemption fee φ∗ = (R∗ − 1)M− > 0 applied to small bonds only. At
8The same observation appears to apply to a related paper by Shi (2006).
9The reason that bonds must be made illiquid is as follows. First, an interest-bearing bond
that circulates across time as a medium of exchange is ruled out by assumption (such a bond
would constitute money, and I have ruled out paying interest on money).
However, it is possible to open the discount window just prior to night-market trading. If
bonds can be used as payment in the night-market, then all agents would swap their money at
this stage for interest-bearing bonds. The eﬀect of this policy would simply be to expand the
supply of money at the rate of interest; precluding implementation of the first-best allocation.
13
the conclusion of trades in the spot market at night, producers will swap their
large money holdings for the large interest-bearing bond, and idle agents will
swap their small money holdings for the small bond. Obviously, the role of
the illiquid bond here is simply to replicate what could have been achieved by
paying interest on money directly (if doing so was possible).
Result 3 If the circulating medium cannot earn interest, then an optimal policy
requires the introduction of an illiquid bond that trades at a strictly positive
discount.
7 Conclusion
My paper provides a rationale for why money should earn interest; or, for what
(almost) amounts to the same thing, why risk-free claims to non-interest-bearing
money should trade at discount. The rationale is as follows. In monetary
economies, eﬃciency dictates that money earn a positive real rate of return.
When lump-sum taxation is feasible, eﬃciency can be achieved by deflating
at the Friedman rule. But when lump-sum taxation is infeasible, the Friedman
rule is not incentive-compatible; i.e., agents are not willing to pay a “fee” if they
derive no personal benefit (interest) from doing so. Hence, a strictly positive
nominal interest rate is essential; with at least a part of the interest expense
financed via a redemption fee designed to be incentive-compatible.
My results bear some relation to those of Berentsen, Camera, and Waller
(2007). These authors examine a quasi-linear model similar to my own except
that they introduce a financial intermediary with a limited recordkeeping tech-
nology. Fiat money is still valued in their model because the intermediary is
prohibited from issuing its own notes (or it is forced to hold 100% cash reserves).
In the context of my model, think of agents interacting with the intermediary
prior to trading in the night-market, but just after realizing their shocks. The
intermediary accepts cash deposits and issues cash loans at interest. Produc-
ers deposit their cash, which is redirected toward consumers in the form of
cash loans. The interest-bearing deposits in their model play a role similar to
the interest-bearing money in my model and the discounted illiquid bond in
Kocherlakota (2003). However, what my analysis suggests is that the limited
recordkeeping they introduce is redundant; implementation is possible without
it.
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